Rising support for populist parties has disrupted the politics of many Western societies. What explains this phenomenon? Two theories are examined here. Perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism --the economic insecurity perspective--emphasizes the consequences of profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies. Alternatively, the cultural backlash thesis suggests that support can be explained as a reaction against cultural changes that threaten the worldview of once-predominant sectors of the population. To consider these arguments, Part I develops the conceptual and theoretical framework. Part II of the study uses the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify the ideological location of 268 political parties in 31 European countries. Part III compares the pattern of European party competition at national-level. Part IV uses the pooled European Social Survey 1-6 (2002-2014) to examine the cross-national evidence at individual level for the impact of the economic insecurity and cultural values as predictors of voting for populist parties. Part V summarizes the key findings and considers their implications. Overall, we find consistent evidence supporting the cultural backlash thesis.
We conclude that cultural values, combined with social and demographic factors, provide the most consistent and parsimonious explanation of voting support for populist parties; their contemporary popularity in Europe is largely due to ideological appeals to traditional values that are concentrated among the older generation, men, the religious, ethnic majorities, and less educated sectors of society. We believe that these are the groups most likely to feel that they have become strangers from the predominant values in their own country, left behind by progressive tides of cultural change that they do not share. Older white men with traditional values--who formed the cultural majority in Western societies until recently--have seen their predominance and privilege eroded. The silent revolution launched in the 1970s seems to have spawned a resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today. In the longer-term, the generation gap seems likely to fade over time, as older cohorts with traditional values are gradually replaced in the population by their children and grand-children, holding more progressive values. In the short-term, however, the heated culture wars dividing young and old have the capacity to heighten generational conflict, to challenge the legitimacy of liberal democracy, and to disrupt long-established patterns of party competition.
I: Theoretical framework
The 2016 presidential election campaign in the United States reflects the phenomenon of populism. Many commentators have found it difficult to understand the rise of Donald Trump. How could such a polarizing figure and political neophyte surge to become the standard-bearer for the GOPmuch less have any chance of entering the White House? He has been sharply attacked by conservatives such as George Will, establishment Republicans such as Jeb Bush, social liberals such as Elizabeth Warren, and socialists such as Bernie Sanders. His rhetoric peddles a mélange of xenophobic fear mongering (against Mexicans and Muslims), deep-seated misogyny, paranoid conspiracy theories about his rivals, and isolationist 'America First' policies abroad. His populism is rooted in claims that he is an outsider to D.C. politics, a self-made billionaire leading an insurgency movement on behalf of ordinary Americans disgusted with the corrupt establishment, incompetent politicians, dishonest Wall Street speculators, arrogant intellectuals, and politically correct liberals. Despite being located on opposite sides of the aisle, Trump's rhetoric taps into some of the same populist anti-elite anger articulated by Bernie Sanders when attacking big corporations, big donors, and big banks.
These appeals have tapped into a large pool of support for Trump among certain sectors of the population. The CNN exit polls across all of the 2016 GOP primaries and caucuses from Iowa onwards revealed that the education gap in support for Trump was substantial; on average, only one quarter of college graduates voted for Trump, compared with almost half (45%) of those with high school education or less. 10 A gender gap was also evident; on average, across all GOP primaries and caucuses, 39% of men voted for Trump compared with 33% of women. These patterns are well-known but a substantial generation gap is also reported in the US elections; the mid-June 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center found that among the under-thirties generation, Clinton enjoyed a 30-point lead over Trump (60:30) , 10-points higher than in the 2008 and 2012 elections. 11 The same poll found that the balance reversed among the over-65 group, with a three point lead for Trump (49:46) . But Trump is far from unique in his demagogic rhetoric. There are historical precedents in America such as Huey Long's Share the Wealth movement, Joe McCarthy's witch-hunting Communists, and George Wallace's white backlash. And Trump's angry nativist rhetoric and nationalistic appeal resembles that of many other populist leaders whose support has been swelling in Western democracies. 12 During the last two decades, in many countries, parties led by populist authoritarian leaders have grown in popularity, gaining legislative seats, reaching ministerial office, and holding the balance of power. Recently we've seen notable gains for the Swiss People's Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swedish Democrats, Greece's Golden Dawn, and the Danish People's Party. Once-dominant parties have lost ground to Marine Le Pen's Front Nationale, Matteo Salvini's Northern League, and Geert Wilders's Party for Freedom. In Eastern Europe, the success of the neo-fascist Jobbik party in Hungary pushed the ruling Fidesz party even further to the right, leading them to build a wall against the wave of migrants flooding across Europe. It's not just Europe, either; Latin America also has populist leaders on the economic left of the political spectrum, exemplified by Hugo Chavez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and Evo Morales in Bolivia. 13 Populist parties do not have to gain large numbers of votes to exert substantial influence; in Britain, for example, the UK Independence Party won only one seat in the May 2015 general election. Nevertheless, its populist rhetoric fueled rabid anti-European and anti-immigration sentiment in Britain, pressuring the Conservatives to call the EU Brexit referendum. The escalating consequences have been profound and catastrophic both at home and abroad, Instigating Britain's messy divorce from the European Union, the resignation of the Prime Minister, challenges to the Labour leadership, prospects for disintegration of the United Kingdom, deep uncertainty in financial markets, an outbreak of hate speech attacking immigrants, and calls by other populist parties to hold similar referenda over EU membership in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and elsewhere. 14 
The concept of populism
What exactly is populism? There are many interpretations of this concept, and numerous attempts to identify the political parties and movements that fall into this category. 15 Mudde has been influential in the literature, suggesting that populist philosophy is a loose set of ideas that share three core features: anti-establishmentism, authoritarianism, and nativism. 16 First, populism is understood as a philosophy that emphasizes faith in the wisdom and virtue of ordinary people (the silent majority) over the 'corrupt' establishment. Populism reflects deep cynicism and resentment of existing authorities, whether big business, big banks, multinational corporations, media pundits, elected politicians and government officials, intellectual elites and scientific experts, and the arrogant and privileged rich. Ordinary people are regarded as homogeneous and inherently 'good' or 'decent', in counterpart to dishonest elites ('Crooked' Hillary/'Lyin' Ted). 17 Secondly, populists also characteristically display authoritarian leanings, favoring the personal power of strong and charismatic leaders who are thought to reflect the will of the people. Populists also favor direct forms of majoritarian democracy for expressing the voice of the people, through opinion polls, referenda and plebiscites, rather than the institutional checks and balances and protection of minority rights built into institutions of representative democracy. 18 Finally, by 'ordinary people', populist discourse typically emphasizes nativism or xenophobic nationalism, which assumes that the 'people' are a uniform whole, and that states should exclude people from other countries and cultures. Populism favors mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national self-interest over international cooperation, closed borders over the free flow of people, ideas, labor and capital, and traditionalism over liberal social values. Hence Trump's rhetoric seeks to stir up racial resentment, intolerance of multiculturalism, nationalistic isolationism, nostalgia for past glories, mistrust of outsiders, traditional misogyny and sexism, the appeal of forceful strongman leadership, attack-dog politics, and racial and anti-Muslim animosity. "Populism" is a standard way of referring to this syndrome, emphasizing its allegedly broad roots in ordinary people; it might more accurately be described as xenophobic authoritarianism.
We view Populist values as representing one pole of a cultural continuum on which Cosmopolitan Liberal values are located at the opposite pole; this dimension is depicted heuristically on the vertical axis of Figure 1 . The word 'cosmopolitan', which derives from the Greek kosmopolitês ('citizen of the world'), suggests that all humans live and interact in a single global community. 19 It thus captures the antithesis to nativism. The conceptual distinction between cosmopolitans and locals has been part of the social sciences since Robert Merton developed it to study small town America during World War II. 20 Cosmopolitan values emphasize the value of open national borders, shared multicultural values, diversity of peoples and lifestyles in outward-looking and inclusive societies. Since World War II, connections among peoples of different nations have become more cosmopolitan, with multiple networks linking their lives. The belief that one lives in a homogenous nation-state is weakened by flows of workers, expatriate employees, tourists, students, refugees, and diaspora communities.
Moreover, Cosmopolitan ideas emphasizing open borders and open societies are combined with Liberal values which challenge the authoritarian component of populism, emphasizing the importance of horizontal checks and balances in the institutions of representative democracy, protection of minority rights, participation through elections and membership of political parties, tolerance of social, intellectual, and political diversity, the process of pluralistic bargaining and compromise, the contribution of scientific expertise for rational policymaking, and the post-war architecture of global governance and international cooperation. Social liberalism is also linked with support for equal rights for women and minorities, flexible rather than fixed gender roles, fluid gender identities and LGBT rights, environmental protection, and secular rather than religious values.
Previous analyses of parties in Western Europe have often associated populism with the Right, using terms such as 'radical right', 'far right', or 'extremist right' parties. 21 But it is increasingly recognized that this fails to capture certain core features of populist parties around the world, such as in the Americas, Eastern Europe, and Asia, where populist parties often favor economic left-wing policies. 22 For example, President Hugo Chavez was a charismatic leader railing against the 'predatory' political elite, economic austerity measures and the United States, when attempting a socialist revolution in Venezuela. In the United States, the Populist Party founded in 1891 was on the left, an anti-elite rural movement critical of capitalism, especially banks, and was associated with organized labor. Similarly, Donald Trump's speeches attacking conservative orthodoxies, advocating protectionist trade barriers, renegotiating NAFTA, and raising import tariffs against Chinese goods, is arguably located on the Populist Left, far from the economic philosophy of neo-conservatives, although his argument favoring business tax cuts is clearly right-wing. For these reasons, as illustrated in Figure 1 , in this study the new cultural cleavage pitting Populists against Cosmopolitan Liberals, is viewed as orthogonal to the classic economic class cleavage, which dominated West European party competition during post-war decades.
[ Figures 1 and 2 about here] Figure 2 depicts how parties are expected to map onto the value cleavages, as illustrated by the German case. The horizontal axis depicted in this heuristic model locates Communists, Socialists and Social Democratic parties on the economic Left, favoring state management of the economy, economic redistribution through progressive taxation, and strong welfare states and public services. By contrast, Liberal, Conservative, and Christian Democratic parties on the economic Right favor free markets and private enterprise, a more modest role for the state, deregulation, and low taxation. The ideological position of green parties is depicted as most clearly favoring Cosmopolitan Liberal values, with populist parties at the opposite pole. Some Populist parties, such as the German Republikaner, UKIP, and the Swiss People's Party (SVP), tend to be located on the economic Right of the horizontal axis, while others, such as Ataka in Bulgaria and Jobbik in Hungary, which advocate policies of redistribution and social protection, and tend to be located on the economic Left. The following section of this paper operationalizes this model and classifies European parties based on expert assessments of their policy positions.
Why is populism on the rise?
Populism is not new; von Beyme suggests that it has historically experienced at least three successive waves, 23 but the late-twentieth century has seen a substantial resurgence of populism. What explains contemporary developments? Many observers offer historical narratives, focused on certain events and particular circumstances, to account for the rise of individual populist parties and leaders in given countries. For example, American commentators have argued that the success of Donald Trump in the GOP primaries reflected a racist reaction to the election (and reelection) of the first AfricanAmerican president to the White House. 24 It has also been thought to rest on the appeal of the outspoken candidate and heated rhetoric triggered by a backlash against 'No drama Obama's' reserved personality, rational control, and cool style. 25 It can also be regarded as the inevitable outcome of the Tea Party tilt pushing the House Republican leadership further to the right and partisan gridlock in Congress, with Trump inheriting the mantle of Sarah Palin. 26 Similarly, the way that Brexit catalyzed support for UKIP and populist movements elsewhere in Europe is open to nation-specific explanations, including the decision by the Conservative party leader, David Cameron, to offer a referendum on Britain's European Union membership as a way to appease Euro-skeptics within his party, the cynical but failed strategy that Boris Johnson followed by heading the 'Leave' campaign in an (unsuccessful) attempt to take over the Conservative party leadership, the role of the tabloid headlines in stoking euroskepticism, public miscalculations by Leave voters under-estimating the impact of their actions, and the capacity of referenda to mobilize protest voting.
Nation-specific events such as these are proximate causes that help to explain why things worked out as they did within a given country--but they do not explain why the vote for populist parties across many countries has roughly doubled in recent decades. Explaining this, requires a general theory.
Comparative explanations for the electoral success of populist parties can be sub-divided into three categories, 27 emphasizing: (i) the institutional rules of the game regulating the market for party competition (such as ballot access laws, effective vote thresholds, types of electoral systems, and political finance regulations); 28 (ii) the supply-side strategic appeals of party leaders and political parties as Downsian rational actors when deciding whether to emphasize either ideological or populist appeals within this institutional context; 29 and/or, (iii) the demand-side role of voter's attitudes, values, and opinions. This paper focuses on the last approach, explaining why people for Populist parties, building on previous work. 30 Explanations of the factors driving changes in mass support for populists have often emphasized either (1) economic inequality and deprivation, focusing on grievances arising from structural changes transforming post-industrial economies, or (2) cultural accounts, emphasizing the role of changing cultural values. What do these theories suggest?
Theories of growing economic inequality in knowledge societies
The argument that populism reflects rising socioeconomic inequalities has long historical rootsfor example, it was applied during the 1950s and 1960s in classic accounts by Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell that sought to explain the appeal of fascism in Weimar Germany, Poujadism in France, and McCarthyism in the United States. All of these movements was seen as authoritarian reactions against modernity, with support coming mainly from the petite bourgeoisie--small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, merchants, self-employed artisans, and independent farmers -squeezed between the growing power of big business and the collective clout of organized labor. 31 Stimulated by fears of downward mobility and loss of social status, fascist parties and extremist movements were said to tap fears and insecurities among those who lost out to industrialization. As Lipset and Bell argued: "Extremist movements have much in common. They appeal to the disgruntled and psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and the authoritarian persons." 32 Echoing and updating these concerns, prominent contemporary theorists such as EspingAnderson argue that during the early twenty first century affluent societies saw the emergence of a new poorly-educated under-class. 33 In this view, some residual appeal of authoritarian movements can still be detected among the petit bourgeoisie, but populist rhetoric is said to have found its most fertile ground among the low-skilled blue collar underclass. Low wages, minimal job security and vulnerability to social risks makes them vulnerable to the appeals of the radical right. 34 Thomas Piketty's influential thesis has brought renewed attention to rising levels of income inequality. 35 In recent decades, the real income of most people in developed Western nations has stagnated or declined; despite substantial economic growth, the gains have gone almost entirely to the top ten percent of the population, largely to the top one percent. Economic inequality has been exacerbated by growing automation and outsourcing, globalization and growing mobility of capital and labor, the erosion of blue-collar labor unions, neo-liberal austerity policies, the growth of the knowledge economy, and the limited capacity of democratic governments to regulate investment decisions by multinational corporations or to stem migration flows.
The contemporary version of the economic vulnerability argument links these developments directly with rising mass support for populism, which is understood to reflect divisions between the winners and losers from global markets, and thus whether one's life is secure or insecure. 36 In this argument, economic vulnerability is conducive to in-group solidarity, rigid conformity to group norms, and rejection of outsiders. Threatened people are said to seek strong, authoritarian leaders to protect them from what are perceived as dangerous outsiders seen as threatening jobs and benefits. 37 Anxiety arising from contemporary events--migrants and refugees flooding into Europe, random acts of domestic terrorism in Paris, Brussels, and Istanbul, and austerity measures--are blamed for exacerbating economic grievances linked with rising income inequality, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and stagnant wages.
These developments are assumed to have been particularly important for the electoral fortunes of European parties. In the center-right, growing secularization has eroded the traditional electoral base of Christian Democratic parties. 38 Meanwhile, on the left, social individualization and fragmentation are believed to have eroded the mass membership of traditional collective organizations, social networks, and mass movements that once mobilized workers' cooperatives and trade unions. 39 Collective movements and organized labor, which in the past channeled the mobilization and expression of working class grievances, have found their negotiating powers undermined by global markets and multinational corporations. Socialist and social democratic parties have found their electoral base eroded by the shrinking numbers of industrial workers, forcing them to widen their electoral appeals as catch-all parties to attract public-sector professionals. 40 Socially-disadvantaged groups, Betz argues, are most prone to blame ethnic minorities and migrant populations for deteriorating conditions, loss of manufacturing jobs, and inadequate welfare services. Populists often advocate trade barriers and tariffs to protect workers from foreign competition, and they attack governments for failing to provide the growing prosperity and sense of shared community that characterized postwar societies (hence Trump's slogan of 'Make America Great Again'). The failure of center-left parties to restore a sense of security and prosperity to the unemployed and under-privileged in affluent societies, this account argues, means that their traditional supporters have fled to populist parties which promise to restore the past golden age. 41 Drawing on these arguments, the economic insecurity thesis explains populism as a product of stagnant or declining real income, as a result of global markets, growing income inequality, and loss of faith that mainstream parties will respond to these concerns. 42 What systematic empirical evidence would support this argument? If the economic insecurity thesis is correct, the logic predicts that mass support for populism should be concentrated among economically marginalized sectors who are the main losers from global markets and technological advances. Thus populist votes should be strongest among unskilled workers, the unemployed, those lacking college degrees, households dependent on welfare benefits as their main source of income, and those living in inner-city urban areas, which typically attract the highest concentrations of foreigners. Populist support should also be linked with subjective feelings of economic insecurity, such as reporting that one has difficulties in making ends meet.
Some previous empirical evidence supports the economic insecurity argument; for example, Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers report that individual-level radical right support in Western Europe was significantly stronger among the unemployed, blue-collar workers, and the less educated, as well as among men.
43 But these were individual-level, not macro-level effects: they did not find stronger voting for these parties in nations with relatively high unemployment rates, for example. 44 In a five-nation comparison, Niedermayer also found that white collar employees and professionals are consistently under-represented in the electorates of radical right parties, although he also demonstrated that the proportion of blue-collar workers and those with low educational achievement varied substantially among different parties such as the Austrian FPÖ, the German Republicans, and the Danish Progress Party. 45 At the same time, however, previous research suggests several reasons to doubt the more mechanical version on the economic argument. Hence a decade ago one study concluded that: "We should look skeptically upon the idea that the radical right is purely a phenomenon of the politics of resentment among the 'new social cleavage' of low-skilled and low-qualified workers in inner-city areas, or that their rise can be attributed in any mechanical fashion to growing levels of unemployment and job insecurity in Europe. The social profile is more complex than popular stereotypes suggest." 46 Mudde is equally doubtful about purely-economic explanations for the rise of populism. 47 Moreover populist parties have also arisen in some of the most egalitarian European societies, with cradle-to-grave welfare states, containing some of the best-educated and most secure populations in the world, such as Sweden and Denmark.
The cultural backlash thesis
An alternative account is provided by the cultural backlash thesis. This perspective emphasizes that populist support can be explained primarily as a social psychological phenomenon, reflecting a nostalgic reaction among older sectors of the electorate seeking a bulwark against long-term processes of value change, the 'silent revolution' that transformed Western cultures during the second half of the twentieth century. This account predicts that support for populism will be especially strong among those holding traditional values and norms, which are concentrated among the older generation and the lesseducated groups.
The rise of Postmaterialist and Self-expression values
A substantial body of survey-based research has documented the cultural transformation that occurred during the last half century in Western societies, exemplified by growing public support for post-materialist and Self-expression values and the decline of traditional values--and the organizational expression of these values in the late-twentieth century through the rise of new cultural issues, social movements, and political parties. 48 Massive time-series evidence demonstrates increased tolerance among the younger cohorts and the college educated in Western societies for the expression of LGBT rights, same-sex marriage and more fluid gender identities; more secular values, habits, and ethical norms; open-mindedness towards migrants, refugees, and multicultural diversity of lifestyles, foods, and travel; and support for international cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and multilateral agencies like the United Nations and EU. 49 In affluent countries, cultures have gradually been transformed by growing support for progressive post-materialist values through inter-generational replacement.
More than 45 years ago, it was argued that "a transformation may be taking place in the political culture of advanced industrial societies. This transformation seems to be altering the basic value priorities of given generations as a result of changing conditions influencing their basic socialization." 50 Subsequent birth cohort analysis, based on hundreds of surveys carried out from 1970 to 2008, indicates that post-war birth cohorts actually did bring an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-materialist values, as younger cohorts gradually replaced older ones in the adult population. 51 This analysis also reveals clear period effects, reflecting current economic conditions: the intergenerational differences persist, but in times of insecurity all cohorts shift toward more Materialist views--and with economic recovery, they shift back toward their long-term baseline, so that across this 38-year span, given cohorts remain at least as Post-materialist as they were at the start.
The cultural shift has been linked with the rise of Green parties, as well as progressive social movements and transnational activist organizations reflecting values such as environmental protection,
LGBT rights, racial and gender equality, overseas aid, and human rights. As post-materialists gradually became more numerous in the population, they brought new issues into politics, leading to a declining emphasis on economic redistribution, declining social class voting and growing party polarization based on cultural issues and social identities. 52 Post-materialists tend to emerge from the more secure and better-educated strata in Western societies and they are relatively favorable towards progressive social change and humanistic values. Over recent decades, the World Values Survey shows that Western societies have been getting steadily more Post-materialist on many social issues, especially among the younger generation and well-educated middle class. 53 At the same time, however, citizens have also become more critical towards established political institutions and authorities, including becoming less trusting of political parties and parliaments in representative democracies. 54 The cultural counter-reaction to the silent revolution These developments have been widely confirmed by survey evidence. 55 But from the start, these developments triggered negative reactions among older traditionalists who felt threatened by the erosion of the values they grew up with. In particular, it is well-established that education, age, and gender are strong predictors of support for Postmaterialist and Self-expression values. Socialization theory suggests that core values are adopted during early childhood and adolescence. As younger birth cohorts with post-materialist values, who grew up in prosperous welfare states, gradually replaced older cohorts, shaped by less secure experiences during World War I, the Great Depression and World War II, the prevailing values of these societies shifted. A substantial body of evidence confirms that growing up with high levels of existential security is conducive to open-mindedness, social tolerance and trust, secularization, and acceptance of diversity. 56 Gender may also play a role in cultural change: traditional patriarchal values about fixed sex roles, once the predominant view in Western societies, have gradually been displaced by progressive, feminist norms favoring social gender equality and interchangeable sex roles in the home and workplace, more diverse forms of marriage and families, and new roles for women in the economy and in politics. 57 Over time, the traditional values held most strongly by the older generation, the less educated and men have gradually fallen out of step with the changing cultures of contemporary Western societies, with this displacement generating resentment, insecurity, and a sense of loss-which seems consistent with the well-documented finding that these groups are most likely to support populist parties. 58 Hostile attitudes towards migrants, ethnic and racial minorities, directed against refugees, asylum-seekers, and guest-workers in Europe, especially towards Muslims, are expected to be an important source of resentment. Many other scholars have tied support for populist parties to attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration. 59 For Betz, for example, the ascendancy of these parties is generated primarily by a public backlash directed against rising numbers of immigrants and asylumseekers, and the failure of mainstream governing parties to curb these numbers and protect national identities through effective public policy regulations. 60 61 We argue that xenophobia is only one part of a much broader cultural backlash among the older generation, rejecting many other liberal and cosmopolitan values diffusing throughout post-industrial societies. This argument has started to emerge among scholars-although the role of generational change is often overlooked and the evidence remains inconclusive. Ignazi argues that the value shift of the 1960s and 1970s was originally linked to the emergence of left-libertarian parties like the Greens, but that it also produced a reactionary backlash among those who continued to hold traditional moral values in Western Europe, a 'silent counter-revolution' that helps the populist right. 62 Similarly, Bornschier has argued that a new cultural cleavage identifies extreme right parties in several West European societies. 63 Bustikova also suggests a parallel process in Eastern Europe, where populist right success is attributed to resentment against ethno-liberal minority parties that have managed to extract policy concessions. 64 Hostility towards the European Union has also been depicted as due, at least in part, to perceptions that membership represents a cultural threat. 65 For example, in the run up to the Brexit referendum, Curtice found many British people regarded EU membership as economically beneficial but they also expressed concern about the cultural consequences. 66 Going beyond the supply-side of the equation, any resentment about cultural trends needs an organizational outlet for expression. Populist movements, leaders, and parties provide a mechanism for channeling active resistance. Hence Trump's slogan 'Make America Great Again' -and his rejection of 'political correctness' -appeals nostalgically to a mythical 'golden past', especially for older white men, when American society was less diverse, U.S. leadership was unrivalled among Western powers during the Cold War era, threats of terrorism pre-9/11 were in distant lands but not at home, and conventional sex roles for women and men reflected traditional power relationships in the family and workforce. The Brexit Leave campaign and UKIP rhetoric also harkens back nostalgically to a time before joining the EU, more than forty years ago, when the Westminster parliament was sovereign, society was predominately white Anglo-Saxon, manufacturing factories and extracting industries -producing steel, coal, cars -still provided well-paying and secure jobs for unionized manual workers, and despite decline from the glory days of empire, Britain remained a major economic and military power leading the Commonwealth. Similar messages can be heard echoed in the rhetoric of Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Donald Trump, and other populist leaders. This nostalgia is most likely to appeal to older citizens who have seen changes erode their cultural predominance and threaten their core social values, provoking anger, resentment, and political disaffection.
What evidence would support this thesis? Value change is strongly predicted by birth cohort, education and sex. If the cultural backlash thesis is true, then this argument predicts that the strongest support for populist parties will be observed among the older generation, men, those lacking college education, and among those holding traditional cultural values in their attitudes towards sexuality, religion, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and tolerance of foreigners. Growing economic insecurity and rising levels of social inequality may also reinforce cultural shifts, suggesting an interaction effect where traditional values will be found to be strongest among poorer and older sectors of the electorate.
II: Measures and evidence
Two arguments are common in the literature seeking to explain contemporary mass support for populist parties: economic accounts, which focus on rising levels of income insecurity and grievances among the losers from global markets, and cultural accounts, which emphasize a generational backlash reacting against long-term shifts away from traditional social values. To examine the individual level survey evidence for each of these theories, we first need to establish a consistent way to distinguish and classify populist parties according to the heuristic model illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 .
Populism is conceptualized in this study as reflecting a loose political ideology emphasizing faith in the 'decent', 'ordinary' or 'little' people over the corrupt political and corporate establishment, nationalist interests (Us) over cosmopolitanism cooperation across borders (Them), protectionist policies regulating the movement of trade, people and finance over global free trade, xenophobia over tolerance of multiculturalism, strong individual leadership over diplomatic bargaining and flexible negotiations, isolationism in foreign and defense policies over international engagement, traditional sex roles for women and men over more fluid gender identities and roles, and traditional over progressive values. The cultural cleavage divides Populism from Cosmopolitan Liberalism, which favors the free flow of people, ideas, capital, and cultures across national borders, and pluralistic forms of governance based on respect for the protection of minority rights and checks and balances in decision-making processes.
For empirical evidence to classify where parties fall on this spectrum, we turn to the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify the ideological location of political parties within each country. 67 The CHES dataset asked experts on European political parties to estimate the ideological and policy positions of political parties in the country with which they were most familiar. The study covered in total 268 political parties in 31 European countries, including all EU member states as well as Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. 68 The most recent CHES survey was conducted between December 2014 and February 2015. Factor analysis with principal component rotation examined the dimensionality of thirteen selected indicators contained in the dataset, where experts rated the position of European parties on a range of Populist items, such as support for traditional values, liberal lifestyles, and multiculturalism, as well as their economic stance towards market deregulation, state management of the economy, and preferences for either tax cuts or public services.
[ Table 1 about here]
The results of the factor analysis presented in Table 1 confirm that the cultural and the economic cleavages form two distinct and consistent dimensions of party competition, as theorized. The items listed in each column were then summed into cultural and economic scales, each standardized to 100 points. The classic scale depicted on the horizontal axis of Figure 3 below divides the economic Left (favoring regulated markets, state management of the economy, wealth redistribution, and public spending) from the economic Right (favoring deregulation, free markets, opposing redistribution, and favoring tax cuts). The cultural cleavage depicted on the vertical axis divides populists (favoring traditional social values, opposing liberal lifestyles, promoting nationalism, favoring tough law and order, opposing multiculturalism, against immigration, opposing rights for ethnic minorities, supporting religious principles in politics, and supporting rural interests) from cosmopolitan liberals (taking the opposite position of all these indices).
To check the external validity and reliability of the CHES measures, the results were compared with an independent study, the Immerzeel, Lubbers, and Coffe expert judgment survey of European Political Parties, conducted in 2010. 69 This study used a similar methodology to estimate the scores of political parties in 38 European countries, with a focus on populist issues such as nationalism and immigration. The two datasets proved to be highly correlated in the perceived position of parties on the ideological scales, lending confidence to the CHES estimates. 70 In addition, for face-value validity, the list of parties ranked according to the CHES cultural scale was compared and confirmed with previous attempts at classifying populist parties. 71 The precise dividing line between populist and other types of political party families inevitably remains somewhat fuzzy, for example when leaders from other mainstream parties adopt some of the xenophobic rhetoric or the restrictive immigration policies espoused by extremist leaders. But comparison with the existing literature suggested that the category of 'populist parties' could be defined and operationalized empirically as those which scored more than 80 points on the standardized 100-point CHES cultural scale. The classification and scores of European populist parties included in our study are listed in Appendix A.
Finally, we turned to the pooled European Social Survey (2002-2014) to examine the crossnational micro-level evidence for both the core arguments. The advantage of this survey is that the pooled dataset across six waves contains 293,856 respondents, providing a large-enough sample of the European public in 32 countries to identify the electoral base of smaller parties with some degree of reliability. Cases were weighted by post-stratification weights including design weights. Scholars have developed several scales to measure populist attitudes in the general population. 72 Supporters of populist parties are measured in this study by their voting preferences, with robustness checks used to see whether similar patterns are evident when predicting party affiliations. Multivariate logistic regression models analyze the evidence for the economic and cultural explanations.
The selected variables and the coding are listed in Technical Appendix B. The models include standard social and demographic controls, including sex, age, education, and ethnicity. Economic inequality was monitored through selected indicators of occupational class (using the Goldthorpe schema), experience of unemployment, households dependent upon social benefits (excluding pensions) for their main source of income, urbanization, and subjective feelings of income insecurity. Principal Component Factor analysis with Varimax Rotation was used to determine the dimensionality of a range of cultural items which were included in all waves of the ESS and which were expected to be particularly salient for the division between Populist and Cosmopolitan Liberal values. Five values scales were produced through this process, including scales on attitudes towards immigration, trust in global governance, trust in national governance, authoritarian values, and left-right ideological self-placement. The value scales were each standardized to 100-points, for ease of comparison. All models were checked by tolerance tests to be free of problems of multicollinearity. The inclusion of items consistently asked across all rounds of the ESS maximized the size of the pooled sample of populist voters, and therefore strengthened confidence in the reliability of the results, although unfortunately it also restricted the full range of items which ideally could be included, for example concerning gender equality. The descriptive means and standard deviations of all the items are presented in Appendix C.
III: Classifying and comparing political parties
As a first step in the analysis, the two ideological scales from the CHES dataset can be used to compare the perceived location of European political parties, according to experts. When European parties were classified on both these scales, using the CHES data, the resulting map of European party competition is illustrated in the scatter-gram presented in Figure 3 . (Figure 3 here)
The top-right quadrant reflects the position of the Populist Right parties, such as the UK Independence Party, the Swiss People's Party (SVP), and the Polish Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy or KNP). These are all economically libertarian and pro-market, socially conservative on traditional values, and deeply Euro-skeptic in orientation. For example, since the early-1990s, under the leadership of Christoph Blocher, the Swiss People's Party has promoted a philosophy of national conservatism, advocating a limited role for government and the welfare state. Its economic policies oppose deficit spending, government regulation of environmental protection, military engagement abroad and closer ties with NATO. On cultural issues it has highlighted euro-skepticism, strict asylum laws, and opposition to multiculturalism and immigration, for example the party pushed successfully for an initiative to ban the construction of minarets, which subsequently became an amendment to the Swiss Constitution. Chaired by Albert Rösti, following the 2015 federal elections, and spurred by fears of the European migration crisis, the SVP became the largest party in the Federal Assembly, winning around one third of the seats. "Environmentalist parties have begun to emerge in many societies in which the electoral system doesn't tend to strangle new parties. Why? The environmentalist cause is only one of many Postmodern issues favored by Postmaterialists. This electorate is distinctive in its entire worldview: they are relatively favorable to women's rights, handicapped groups, gay/lesbian emancipation, ethnic minorities and a number of other causes. But the environmental cause has emerged as the symbolic center of this broad cultural emancipation movement… Nevertheless, the rise of Postmaterialist causes has given rise to negative reactions from the very start. The French student protest movement was able to paralyze the entire country in May, 1968; but it led to a massive shift of working class voters, who rallied behind De Gaulle as the guarantor of law and order, giving the Gaullists a landslide victory in the June, 1968 elections. In the same year, student protesters in the U.S. were able to bring down Lyndon Johnson, but they alienated much of the traditional Democratic Party electorate--many of whom threw their support to a reactionary candidate, George Wallace, enabling Richard Nixon to win the Presidency. The 1972 elections were something of a replay, except that this time normally Democratic voters who were repelled by the seeming radicalism of the McGovern campaign supported Nixon: for the first time in history, white working class voters were about as likely to vote for the Republican as for the Democratic candidate. The aftermath of these events transformed the two parties, but the U.S. still has a two party system, with the same party labels as before: superficially, the system seems unchanged.
Though Postmaterialist-led parties emerged in both The Netherlands and Belgium during the 1970s, West Germany was the scene of the first breakthrough by an environmentalist party in a major industrial nation. Postmaterialist protest had manifested itself as dramatically in Germany as in the United States or France, but it was only in 1983 that the Greens were sufficiently strong and well organized to surmount Germany's 5 per cent hurdle and enter the West German parliament--bringing a significant structural change to German politics. But more recently, the Greens have been pitted against a Republikaner party characterized by cultural conservatism and xenophobia. In the 1994 national elections, the Greens won 7 percent of the vote. The Republikaner, on the other hand, were stigmatized as the heirs of the Nazis and won only two percent of the vote, which was insufficient to win parliamentary representation. Nevertheless, xenophobic forces have already had a substantial impact on German politics, motivating the established parties to shift their policy positions in order to coopt the Republikaner electorate. These efforts even included an amendment to the German constitution: to cut down the influx of foreigners, the clause guaranteeing free right of political asylum was eliminated in 1993, in a decision supported by a two-thirds majority of the German parliament.
The rise of the Green Party in Germany has also had a major impact even though only a small portion of the electorate votes for it… Their greatest impact on German politics has been in forcing the established parties, from the Christian Democrats to the Social Democrats, to adopt pro-environmentalist positions in order to compete for the Greens' voters. The Greens and the Republikaner are located at opposite poles of a new political dimension, as Figure 2 suggests. If we simply judged by their labels, this might not seem to be the case: the Republikaner do not call themselves the Anti-Environment Party; nor do the Greens call themselves the Pro-Immigrant Party. But, in fact, their constituencies are disproportionately Materialist and Postmaterialist, respectively; and these parties adopt opposite policies on the relevant issues. The older parties are arrayed on the traditional economic Left-Right axis, established in an era when political cleavages were dominated by social class conflict. On this axis (the horizontal dimension of Figure  3 ) both elites and mass electorates place the Party of Democratic Socialism (the East German excommunists) on the extreme Left, followed by the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats, with the Christian Democrats at the Right of the spectrum. Though both elites and masses tend to think of the Greens as located on the Left, they represent an entirely new Left. Traditionally, the Left parties have been based on a working class constituency, and advocated a program that called for nationalization of industry and redistribution of income. In striking contrast, the Postmaterialist Left appeals primarily to a middle class constituency and is only faintly interested in the classic program of the Left. For example, Postmaterialists are not necessarily more favorable to state ownership than are Materialists, as evidence cited below indicates. But Postmaterialists are intensely favorable to the Left position on Postmodern issues--which frequently repel the traditional working class constituency of the Left.
The vertical axis on Figure 2 reflects the polarization between Postmodern and Fundamentalist values, reflecting differences in people's subjective sense of security. At one pole, we find a Postmodern openness to ethnic diversity and changing gender roles; and at the opposite pole we find an emphasis on familiar values (often rooted in traditional religion), in the face of insecurity… Fundamentalist movements continue to emerge among the less secure strata of even the most advanced industrial societies, with people reemphasizing traditional values in times of stress." 75 A cultural backlash against Post-materialist values has been present ever since Postmaterialists first surfaced into political relevance in the late 1960s. But in the 1970s and 1980s, the most dramatic phenomenon was the rise of progressive movements and parties such as the Greens. In that era, cultural backlash parties, such as France's National Front, were relatively small. Today, they have become important parties in many countries and Donald Trump has become the candidate of a major party in the U.S.
Rising voting support for populist parties
In recent decades, Populist parties have gained growing support among the electorates of developed countries. Based on ParlGov data, and applying the party classification described above, the graph in Figure 4 illustrates the growing share of the vote for both Populist Right and Populist Left parties since 1970 in national and European parliamentary elections across European countries. 76 This suggests that a rise occurred during the 1970s, and a surge of support during the 1980s and 1990s, before a subsequent slow down or levelling off in the last decade. The mean share of the vote for Populist Right parties rose from 6.7% in the 1960s to 13.4% in 2010s. During the same period, their average share of seats rose from 5.9% to 13.7%. The mean share of the vote for the Populist Left parties rose from 2.4% in the 1960s to 12.7% in 2010s, while their share of seats increased on average from 0.12 to 11.5% during the same decades. Gains were particularly dramatic following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of party competition in Central and Eastern Europe. Most recently, the 2014 European Parliament elections also saw a surge of support for Populist parties such as France's National Front, Italy's Five Star Alliance, the Danish People's Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and the United Kingdom Independence Party. (Figure 4 here) The success of populists varies substantially across European societies, however, and support has been volatile and erratic over time; their weakly-institutionalized parties are sometimes unable to replace a charismatic leader and they generally lack a strong extra-parliamentary organizational base. Thus, in the UK, the British National Party and the National Front were both eclipsed by the UK Independence Party. Figure 4 illustrates the share of the vote for populist parties in national elections across two dozen European states from 1970 to 2016. It is apparent that their share of the vote varies even among relatively similar post-industrial knowledge economies, neighboring states with shared cultures, and states using broadly similar majoritarian or proportional electoral systems, as is illustrated by the contrasts between Norway and Sweden, between Austria and Germany (with radical right parties heavily restricted by the German constitution), and between Britain and France. This suggest that both supply-side factors and the institutional rules of the game are important parts of any comprehensive explanations accounting for the fortunes of specific populist parties.
The changing policy agenda
Further evidence from the analysis of manifesto data also demonstrates the shifting battleground of European party competition and the rise of the Cultural cleavage. During post-war decades, the pattern of party competition in Western Europe was mainly based on divisions between communist and socialist parties on the Left and economically conservative and classical liberal parties on the Right, which were divided primarily over issues of Keynesian economic management, redistributive taxation, and welfare state spending. During the 1950s and 1960s, mainstream parties prioritized bread-andbutter economic and social policy issues in their policy platforms --such as unemployment, inflation, taxation, trade union rights, public services, health-care, housing, education, and welfare --mobilizing class cleavages and partisan affiliations in the electorate. Other policy divisions, such as those over foreign policy and international relations, usually played a more minor role in electoral politics, and these largely reinforced the economic divisions in party competition. The major political parties were established in an era when economic issues of growth, jobs, taxes and inflation were dominant and the working class was the main base of support for socialist, communist and social democratic parties.
Today economic inequality remains a major issue, dividing the winners and losers from global markets and free trade. The classic economic issues did not disappear by any means. But their relative prominence declined to such an extent that by the late-1980s, as Figure 5 shows, non-economic issues had become more prominent than economic issues in Western political party campaign platforms. The growing salience of progressive values in society has stimulated th emergence of a new Cultural cleavage in party competition that has undermined the post-war party systems. Today, many of the most heated conflicts are cultural -based on issues such as immigration, the threat of terrorism, abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and more fluid gender identities, while support for progressive change on these issues increasingly comes from well-educated younger Post-materialists, largely of middle class origin.
[ Figure 5 here] Figure 5 illustrates how the issues emphasized in political party platforms evolved from 1950 to 2010, in thirteen Western democracies (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States). This figure shows the declining emphasis on economic issues, which dominated party programs until around 1968, when issues raised by student protest briefly dominated the agenda. Economic issues again dominated political discussion from 1970 to the early-1980s, when non-economic issues began to take over. For the last two decades, non-economic issues have consistently dominated party competition and rival manifesto platforms by a wide margin.
The decline of class voting
Moreover, the social class foundation of economic Left and Right party competition has also shifted. A long-standing truism of political sociology, since the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, is that working class voters tend to support the parties of the Left, and middle class voters those of the Right, throughout Western society. 77 This was an accurate description of reality around 1950, but the tendency has grown steadily weaker. The rise of cultural issues tends to neutralize social class-based political polarization. The social basis of support for the new policies of the Left has increasingly come from middle class sources--but, at the same time, a substantial share of the working class has shifted their support to populist parties.
[ Figure 6 here] As Figure 6 demonstrates, social class voting declined markedly from 1950 to 1992. If 75 per cent of the working class voted for the Left, while only 25 per cent of the middle class did so, one would obtain a class voting index of 50. This is about where the Swedish electorate was located in 1948--but by 1990 the index had fallen to 26. Norway, Sweden and Denmark have traditionally manifested the world's highest levels of social class voting, but they all showed sharply declining levels of social class voting during this period. 78 In the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany in the late 1940s and early-1950s, working class voters were more likely to support the Left than middle class voters, by margins ranging from 30 to 45 percentage points. By the 1980s, class voting had fallen to the lowest levels ever recorded in Britain, France, Sweden and West Germany. By the 1990s, social class voting in most democracies was less than half as strong as it was a generation earlier. In the U.S., it had fallen so low that there was virtually no room for further decline. Income and education had become much weaker indicators of the American public's political preferences than religiosity or one's stand on abortion or same-sex marriage: by wide margins, those who opposed abortion and same-sex marriage supported Republican Presidential candidates over Democratic candidates. The electorate had shifted from class-based polarization toward value-based polarization. Growing emphasis on cultural issues had strongly positive consequences-but it also drew attention away from the classic economic redistribution issues. From the 1930s to the 1970s, working class-oriented parties of the center Left had played a major role in Western countries, electing governments that implemented redistributive policies, from progressive income taxes to health care and social security programs that reduced economic inequality and increased existential security. Emphasis on these programs faded.
IV: Analyzing mass support for European populist parties
What is the mass basis of support for populist parties and, in particular, what is the role of economic and cultural factors? To examine the cross-national evidence, we draw upon the pooled European Social Survey, covering the period 2002-2014. Table 2 presents the results of logistic regression models predicting voting for a populist party in the previous national election. Model A includes the demographic and social controls, including age, sex, education, religiosity, and belonging to an ethnic minority. Model B adds several indicators closely associated with economic deprivation and inequality, including the Goldthorpe class schema, experience of unemployment, living on welfare benefits, urbanization, and subjective economic insecurity (reported difficulty of living on current household income), all potential predictors of populist support. Model C adds the cultural value scales associated with populist ideology, including attitudes towards immigration, global governance, trust in national governments, authoritarian values, and self-position on the left-right ideological scale. Model D presents the full model combining all variables, including interaction effects linking attitudes with economic insecurity.
The models highlight several main findings.
First, the results in Model A with controls confirm that several standard social and demographic factors are consistently associated with voting for populist parties. Age is a significant predictor, with younger voters being less likely to vote for populist parties than older voters (see Figure 8 ). This provides initial support for the cultural change explanation, which emphasizes intergenerational differences. The consistent gender gap, documented in many previous studies, is also further confirmed here, with men beinging more likely to vote for populist parties than women. Education also proves significant, as expected, with populist parties winning greater support from the less educated sectors of the population (although this effect becomes insignificant later in models D and E). Strength of religiosity, closely linked with a wide range of traditional values, is also positively associated with voting for populist parties. Not surprisingly, given populism's xenophobic rhetoric, members of ethnic minorities are less inclined to support these parties. In short, Populist support is greatest among the older generation, men, the less educated, ethnic majority populations, and the religious. These relationships remain stable across successive models, confirming the demographic profile found in earlier studies--but the reasons for these relationships remains unclear and open to alternative interpretations. 79 Educational effects, for example, could be attributed either to their role in determining subsequent life-chances, or to the values and knowledge acquired from formal schooling. These findings cannot by themselves definitively rule out either the economic insecurity argument or the cultural backlash thesis.
[ Table 2 and Figures 8 and 9 about here] Model B examines more directly whether indicators of economic insecurity are associated with voting for populists, applyinig the controls mentioned above. The results of the analysis are mixed and inconsistent across alternative measures of economic insecurity. The Goldthorpe occupational class scheme is included in the model; here the results suggest that, compared with Managers and Professionals (the default category), all other class strata are positively linked with support for populist parties. But, as early sociological theories suggested, the strongest populist support (according to the Beta coefficients) is found among the petty bourgeoisie -small proprietors, such as self-employed plumbers, or the owners of small businesses, and mom-and-pop shop-keepers-and not among the economically most-deprived category, the poorly-paid, unskilled manual workers. 80 Figure 9 illustrates this pattern. Supporting the economic deprivation thesis, having experienced unemployment was linked with populist voting. Subjective insecurity (reported difficulties of living on current household incomes) was also significant in this model, although this effect reversed itself in Model C, once cultural attitudes were added. Moreover, contrary to the economic insecurity thesis, populists received significantly less support (not more) from, those dependent on social benefits as the main source of household income (defined as excluding pensions, to reduce contamination with the age effects). Populist voting support was also concentrated in rural villages, rather than inner-city urban areas which typically have higher percentages of resident foreigners and social deprivation. The overall fit of Model B does not improve much from Model A alone. Further tests, for example with a different occupational class schema, also suggest that the results are sensitive to the exact model specification rather than being robust. In short, the economic insecurity thesis is only partially supported by these findings-with unemployment being the clearest socio-economic indicator of populist voting support.
Model C enters the five of the cultural value scales that were expected to predict voting support for populist parties: anti-immigrant attitudes, distrust of global governance, distrust of national governance, support for authoritarian values, and left-right ideological self-placement. All five of the cultural indicators are significantly linked with populist voting and the coefficients point in the expected direction. The fit of the model (measured by Nagelkerke R 2 ) also improves considerably from earlier models when these variables are added, although still relatively modest, and the controls remain consistent and stable. In summary, Model C combining social controls and cultural attitudes provides a consistent and parsimonious account of populist voting in Europe.
To explore further, Model D tests the effects of combining the economic and cultural indicators, with controls. The results largely confirm the observations made from earlier models. The demographic and social controls and the cultural attitudes remain stable predictors of populist support. The only major change to the economic variables is that the effect of economic insecurity reverses its direction.
Finally, Model E tests the effects of analyzing all of the variables discussed so far, together with interaction effects for subjective insecurity (reported difficulties of living on household income) combined with each of the attitudinal scales. The aim of this model is to explore the claim that subjective economic insecurity helps to drive traditional attitudes which, in turn, strengthens support for populist parties. The results in Model E show that the control variables remain constant except for education, which becomes insignificant. Among all the interaction terms, populist support can only be attributed to a combination of economic insecurity and authoritarian values. The other interaction effects point in the incorrect direction or become insignificant. Moreover, Model E does not greatly improve the overall goodness of fit compared with Model C.
The analysis in Table 2 leads us to conclude that Model C provides the most satisfactory and parsimonious account. This suggests that the combination of several standard demographic and social controls (age, sex, education, religiosity and ethnic minority status) with cultural values provides the most useful explanation for European support for populist parties. Their support is concentrated among the older generation, men, religious people, majority populations, and the less educated--groups generally left behind by progressive tides of cultural value change. The electoral success of populist parties can be attributed mainly to their ideological and issue appeals to traditional values. This is not an isolated finding or a quirk of fieldwork. If we examine some classic measures of tolerance towards sexual liberalization and value change--including attitudes towards homosexuality and abortion--the less-educated show much lower levels of tolerance. The education gap also appears to widen slightly over time, suggesting that differences in cultural values and social tolerance have expanded, rather than shrunk. This initial evidence is only suggestive at present, but it will be possible to examine the basis of support for Trump more closely after the November 2016 U.S. presidential elections, when evidence from such sources as the American National Election Study become available, along with long-term data from the 7 th wave of the World Values Survey.
U.S. Attitudes

V: Conclusions and discussion
Extensive research indicates that since about 1970, affluent Western societies have seen growing emphasis on post-materialist and self-expression values among the younger birth cohorts and the better-educated strata of society. This has brought rising emphasis on such issues as environmental protection, increased acceptance of gender and racial equality, and equal rights for the LGBT community. This cultural shift has fostered greater approval of social tolerance of diverse lifestyles, religions and cultures, international cooperation, democratic governance, and protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights. Social movements reflecting these values have brought policies such as environmental protection, same sex marriage, and gender equality to the center of the political agenda, drawing attention away from the classic economic redistribution issues. But the spread of new values has also stimulated a cultural backlash among people who feel threatened by the erosion of the values and worldview with which they grew up. To a considerable extent, less educated and older citizens, and white males who once dominated the majority culture in Western societies, have come to feel that they are being marginalized within their own countries. As cultures have shifted, a tipping point appears to have occurred.
The story of long-term cultural change in Western societies, and the emergence of new Green parties and progressive social movements building upon these values, is a familiar one widely documented in a long-series of previous studies. 81 During the era from 1970 to 1990, the main story was the rise of Post-materialist issues. In recent decades, however, in Western democracies the backlash against cultural change has become increasingly prominent. Throughout advanced industrial society, massive cultural changes have been occurring that seem shocking to those with traditional values. Moreover, immigration flows, especially from lower-income countries, changed the ethnic makeup of advanced industrial societies. The newcomers speak different languages and have different religions and life styles from those of the native population-reinforcing the impression that traditional norms and values are rapidly disappearing. The evidence examined in this study suggests that the rise of populist parties reflects, above all, a reaction against rapid cultural changes that seem to be eroding the basic values and customs of Western societies. Long-term processes of generational change during the late twentieth century have catalyzed culture wars, for these changes are particularly alarming to the less educated and older groups in these countries. It is not an either/or story, for the two sets of changes may reinforce each other-but the evidence examined here suggests that it would be a mistake to attribute the rise of populism directly to economic insecurity and inequality alone. Psychological factors seem to play an even more important role. Older birth cohorts and less-educated groups support populist parties and leaders that defend traditional cultural values and emphasize nationalistic and xenophobia appeals, rejecting outsiders, and upholding traditional gender roles. Populists support charismatic leaders, reflecting a deep mistrust of the 'establishment' and mainstream parties who are led nowadays by educated elites who have adopted progressive cultural views.
At the same time, this study suggests several directions for further research. It is important to conduct additional robustness tests, including using alternative models of voting for leftwing and rightwing populism, and using models of partisan affiliations with populist parties (not just voting), to replicate the results and see whether they lend further confidence to the findings reported here. The pooled ESS from 2002-2014 provides sufficient cases to examine support for smaller parties, but this approach does not enable one to analyze long-term dynamic patterns. Further cross-national time-series evidence needs to be scrutinized, such as from the Eurobarometer series or national election studies, to examine long-term trends in cultural attitudes and populist voting support since the early-1970s, establishing more conclusive evidence of linkages theorized to exist between changes in cultural values and changes in populist support in Europe, providing additional insight into the rise of populism.
It is important to understand this topic since it is apparent that its consequences are likely to be profound. Populist forces have already proven decisive for the outcome of the British referendum on membership in the European Union in June 2016, igniting anti-immigrant and nativist sentiments that have generated a deep financial, political, and constitutional crisis within the United Kingdom. Britain's decision to withdraw from the EU threatens to reenergize populist forces across Europe. Support for populism also exists in the United States, which Donald Trump has been able to exploit. His rejection of "political correctness" seems particularly appealing to older, religious white traditionalists who find themselves left behind by growing support for such issues as same-sex marriage, gender equality for women in politics, and immigration rights. The rejection of new values is not confined to the views of Donald Trump; the 2016 GOP platform is extreme in promising to promulgate strict traditionalist views on the family and child-rearing, homosexuality and gender, demanding that lawmakers use Christianity as a guide, encouraging the teaching of the bible in public schools, opposing same-sex marriage, disapproving of gay and transgender rights, and barring military women from combat. 82 These policies appeal deeply to those intolerant of new values -but this is a shrinking sector that is swimming against the tide of intergenerational value change in the American electorate. If the cultural backlash argument is correct, it has significant implications. The generational gap in Western societies is likely to heighten the salience of the cultural cleavage in future politics, regardless of possible improvements in the underlying economic conditions or any potential slowdown in globalization. The orthogonal pull of cultural politics generates tensions and divisions within mainstream parties, allowing new opportunities for populist leaders to mobilize electoral support. Nevertheless, it remains challenging for populist parties to build an organizational base that would enable them to sustain any breakthroughs that enable them to enter government coalitions. The net result is that Western societies face more unpredictable contests, anti-establishment populist challenges to the legitimacy of liberal democracy, and potential disruptions to long-established patterns of party competition. Notes: Logistic regression models predicting whether respondents voted for a populist party (1) or not (0). Sig *** .001, ** .01, * .05, N/s Not significant. Note that Managerial/Professional is the excluded occupational class category. Note that 'Subjective economic insecurity' is measured by whether respondent reported that it was comfortable or difficult to live on their present household income, using a 4-point scale where 'very difficult' was high. 1952  1954  1956  1958  1960  1962  1964  1966  1968  1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010 non-economic issues economic issues 
Authoritarian values
Importance of obey, safe, rules, strong government, tradition.
Scale 0-100
Safe Important to life in secure and safe surroundings Scale 1-6 Rules Important to do what is told and follow rules Scale 1-6 Behave Important to behave properly Scale 1-6 Stgov Important that government is strong and ensures safety 
